KFD-2: Trust must start from facts
- Status: active
- Number: 2
- Kind: principle
- Applies to: any adopting product, repository, release surface, extension surface, or hosted surface that represents work, evidence, control, provenance, or trust
One sentence
Trust must start from facts.
A product must not ask users or agents to trust an important claim before the relevant facts and assurance responsibility are inspectable.
Decision
KFD-2 is the generic trust principle for product, artifact, runtime, contract, collaboration, and release claims. Capability, accuracy, calibration, scale, reputation, and persuasive explanation may support a claim; none can replace its fact boundary, residual risk, or assurance responsibility.
The default path is:
captured work
-> inspectable facts
-> assurance responsibility
-> proof-backed decision
-> reviewable and exportable record
This path keeps trust bounded and revisable. Contradictory evidence can lower, withdraw, or redirect trust without first defeating the authority of the system that made the claim. The easiest reliable path should also be the path that naturally leaves enough evidence for later review.
Requirements
- Load-bearing claims bind to local, inspectable, and exportable facts wherever the product can reasonably capture them.
- UI, CLI, API, and agent surfaces lead participants to the fact source before asking them to rely on summaries or invisible state.
- Control actions such as continue, stop, retry, approve, hand off, archive, publish, or revoke derive from assurance responsibility plus proof.
- Extensions, skills, adapters, and plugins do not bypass the fact source or silently mutate canonical records.
- Release and provenance evidence make artifact trust reviewable rather than dependent on maintainer reputation alone.
- Cloud services may add convenience, but must not become the only place where operational truth exists.
Trust assessment
A trust assessment starts from a claim and states:
- the subject and exact claim;
- bound facts and checked evidence;
- machine-verifiable and non-verifiable portions;
- residual risk and known gaps;
- source, verification, and decision owners;
- a result of pass, warning, fail, or unverifiable.
Release passports are one projection of this model. The same model assesses contract worlds, APIs, ABIs, configs, collaboration interfaces, observer perspectives, runtime facts, documentation, and other surfaces.
Boundaries
KFD-2 does not require perfect capture, a journal engine, a runtime ledger, or the rejection of cloud services. It does not declare every opaque system wrong. It requires adopting systems to make important reliance claims inspectable and to expose what remains unproved.
Relation to other KFDs
KFD-1 prevents the fact source beneath a claim from drifting. KFD-2 determines how much trust those facts support. KFD-3 governs how trusted value is offered to intelligent participants. Later KFDs may supply claims for KFD-2 assessment but do not silently supersede it; explicit supersession must appear in both the decision and registry.
Verification
The @kungfu-tech/kfd package publishes KFD-2 trust-taxonomy, claim,
assessment, release-claim, and release-passport schemas. Unknown taxonomy
values fail validation rather than becoming private local extensions. Package
self-proof and the standard extension path are documented in
docs/KFD-2-usage.md.
Adopters
Adopters cite KFD-2 whenever a surface asks a human or agent to rely on a claim, decision, artifact, control state, or provenance record. Implementation evidence remains adopter-owned.